



**Red Hat Enterprise Linux libcrypt  
Cryptographic Module v4.0**

**Red Hat Enterprise Linux libcrypt  
Cryptographic Module v5.0**

**FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy**

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# 1 Introduction

This document is the non-proprietary Security Policy for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v4.0 and Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v5.0. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2) for a Security Level 1 module.

## 2 Cryptographic Module Specification

### 2.1 Module Overview

The Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v4.0 and Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v5.0 (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a software library implementing general purpose cryptographic algorithms. The module provides cryptographic services to applications running in the user space of the underlying operating system through an application program interface (API).

The module is implemented as a set of shared libraries / binary files; as shown in the diagram below, the shared library files and the integrity check file used to verify the module's integrity constitute the logical cryptographic boundary:




Figure 1: Software Block Diagram

The module is aimed to run in a general purpose computer. The physical boundary is the surface of the case of the target platform, as shown in the diagram below:




Figure 2: Hardware Block Diagram

All components of the module will be in the libgcrypt RPM. The following RPMs files constitute the module:

- Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v4.0: libgcrypt-1.5.3-12.el7\_1.1.rpm
- Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v5.0: libgcrypt-1.5.3-14.el7.rpm

When installed on the system, the module comprises the following files:

- /usr/lib64/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2
- /usr/lib64/.libgcrypt.so.11.hmac
- /usr/lib/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2
- /usr/lib/.libgcrypt.so.11.hmac

*Note: the files /usr/lib64/libgcrypt.so.11 and /usr/lib/libgcrypt.so.11 are symlinks respectively to /usr/lib64/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2 and /usr/lib/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2; the files /usr/lib64/libgcrypt.so.hmac and /usr/lib/libgcrypt.so.hmac are symlinks respectively to /usr/lib64/.libgcrypt.so.11.hmac and /usr/lib/.libgcrypt.so.11.hmac. These four symlinks files are not part of the module*

## 2.2 FIPS 140-2 validation

For the purpose of the FIPS 140-2 validation, the module is a software-only, multi-chip standalone cryptographic module validated at security level 1. The table below shows the security level claimed for each of the eleven sections that comprise the FIPS 140-2 standard:

FIPS 140-2 Section		Security Level
1	Cryptographic Module Specification	1
2	Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
3	Roles, Services and Authentication	1
4	Finite State Model	1
5	Physical Security	N/A
6	Operational Environment	1
7	Cryptographic Key Management	1
8	EMI/EMC	1
9	Self Tests	1
10	Design Assurance	1
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	1

Table 1: Security Levels

The Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v4.0 module has been tested on the following platform(s):

Construct or	Hardware	Processor	Operating System	Tested		
				With AES-NI	Without AES-NI	With CPACF
HP	Proliant DL380p Gen8	Intel® Xeon® E5-2600 v3 product family	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1	yes	yes	n/a
IBM	POWER8 Little Endian 8286-41A	POWER8E	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1	n/a	n/a	n/a
IBM	z13	IBM/S390	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1	n/a	n/a	yes

Table 2: Tested Platform(s) for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v4.0

The Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v5.0 module has been tested on the following platform(s):

Construct or	Hardware	Processor	Operating System	Tested		
				With AES-NI	Without AES-NI	With CPACF
Dell	PowerEdge R630	Intel Xeon E5-2640 v3	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.4	no	yes	n/a

Table 3: Tested Platform(s) for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v5.0

The physical boundary is the surface of the case of the target platform. The logical boundary is depicted in the software block diagram.

The module also includes algorithm implementations using Processor Algorithm Acceleration (PAA) functions provided by the different processors supported, as shown in the following table:

Processor	Processor Algorithm Acceleration (PAA) function	Cryptographic Module implementation
Intel x86	AES-NI	AES

Table 4: PAA function implementations

## 2.3 Modes of Operations

The module supports two modes of operation: FIPS approved and non-approved modes.

The mode of operation in which the module is operating can be determined by:

- If the file `/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled` exists and contains a numeric value other than 0, libgcrypt is put into FIPS mode at initialization time
- If the file `/etc/gcrypt/fips_enabled` exists, libgcrypt is put into FIPS mode at initialization time. Note that this filename is hardwired and does not depend on any configuration options.

The module turns to the FIPS approved mode after the initialization and the power-on self-tests have completed successfully.

When libgcrypt is in the FIPS mode of operation, the request of services involving non-FIPS approved algorithms will be denied. However, the module does not check for approved key sizes or approved mode of algorithms.

The services available in FIPS mode can be found in section 4.2, Table 6.

The non-Approved but allowed services can be found in section 4.2, Table 7.

The services available in non-FIPS mode can be found in section 4.2, Table 8.

*Note: Using a non-Approved key sizes, algorithms or block chaining mode specified in Table 8 will result in the module implicitly entering the non-FIPS mode of operation.*

### 3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces

As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. For the purpose of the FIPS 140-2 validation, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware platform on which it runs.

The logical interfaces are the application program interface (API) through which applications request services. The following table summarizes the four logical interfaces:

Logical interface	Description
Data input	API input parameters for data
Data output	API output parameters for data
Control input	API function calls, API input parameters, /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled control file, /etc/gcrypt/fips_enabled configuration file
Status output	API return codes, API output parameters

Table 5: Logical Interfaces

The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API functions. The Data Output interface consists of the output parameters of the API functions. The Control Input interface consists of the API function calls and the input parameters used to control the behavior of the module. The Status Output interface includes the return values of the API functions and status sent through output parameters.

## 4 Roles, Services and Authentication

### 4.1 Roles

The module supports the following roles:

- **User role:** performs all services, except module installation and configuration.
- **Crypto Officer role:** performs module installation and configuration and some basic functions: get status function and performing self-tests.

The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing the module services.

### 4.2 Services

The module supports services available to users in the available roles. All services are described in detail in the user documentation.

The following table shows the available services, the roles allowed (“CO” stands for Crypto Officer role and “U” stands for User role), the Critical Security Parameters involved and how they are accessed in the FIPS mode:

Service	Algorithm	Key Length	Note / Mode	CAVS Cert.	Role	CSPs	Access
Symmetric encryption/decryption	Triple-DES	168 bits	Modes: ECB, CBC, CFB64, OFB, CTR  3-key Triple-DES encryption/decryption  2-key Triple-DES decryption only	Certs. #2030, #2031, #2032, #2033 and #2034  Certs. #2433 and #2434	U	168 bits Triple-DES Key	R, W, EX
	AES	128, 192 and 256 bits	Modes: ECB, CBC, CFB128, OFB, CTR	Certs. #3643, #3644, #3645, #3646, #3647, #3648 and #3649  Certs. #4580 and #4581	U	128/192/256 bits AES Key	R, W, EX
Get Key Length	N/A	N/A	cipher_get_keylen() function	N/A	U	N/A	R
Get Block Length	N/A	N/A	cipher_get_blocksize() function	N/A	U	N/A	R
Check	N/A	N/A	cipher_get_blocksize()	N/A	U	N/A	R

Service	Algorithm	Key Length	Note / Mode	CAVS Cert.	Role	CSPs	Access
availability of Algorithm			ocksize() function				
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHS)	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	N/A	N/A	Certs. #3062, #3063, #3064, #3065 and #3066  Certs. #3756 and #3757	U	N/A	R, W, EX
HMAC	HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512	At least 112 bits KS<BS, KS=BS, KS>BS	N/A	Certs. #2395, #2396, #2397, #2398 and #2399  Certs. #3030 and #3031	U	MAC-key	R, W, EX
RSA	Key pair generation, signature generation and verification	2048 and 3072 bits modulus  1024 bits signature verification for legacy-use	FIPS 186-4, RSASSA-PKCS #1.5  RSASSA-PSS	Certs. #1879, #1880, #1881, #1882 and #1883  Certs. #2498 and #2499	U	RSA private key	R, W, EX
DSA	Key pair generation, signature generation and verification	L=2048, N=224; L=2048, N=256; L=3072, N=256;	FIPS 186-4	Certs. #1017, #1018, #1019, #1020 and #1021	U	DSA private keys	R, W, EX
	Signature verification	L=1024, N=160		Certs. #1214 and #1215			
Generate random numbers	SP 800-90A DRBG: HMAC_DRBG with SHA-1/256/384/512 HASH_DRBG with SHA-	N/A	Fill buffer with length random bytes, function to allocate a memory	Certs. #976, #977, #978, #979 and #980	U	Seed	W, EX

Service	Algorithm	Key Length	Note / Mode	CAVS Cert.	Role	CSPs	Access
	1/256/384/512 (with and without prediction resistance) SP 800-90A DRBG: CTR_DRBG with derivation function AES 128/192/256 (with and without prediction resistance)		block consisting of nbytes of random bytes, function to allocate a memory block consisting of nbytes fresh random bytes using a random quality as defined by level. This function differs from gcry_randomize() in that the returned buffer is allocated in a "secure" area of the memory	Certs. #1527 and #1528 Certs. #972, #973, #974, #975, #976, #977 and #978 Certs. #1527 and #1528			
Initialize Module	N/A	N/A	Powering-up the module	N/A	U	N/A	EX
Selftests	N/A	N/A	Performs Known Answer Test (KAT) and integrity check	N/A	U CO	N/A	EX
Zeroize secure memory	N/A	N/A	gcry_free() or gcry_xfree() functions	N/A	U	All CSPs stored in that secure memory	W, EX
Release all resources of context created by gcry_cipher_open()	N/A	N/A	Zeroises all sensitive information associated with this cipher handle	N/A	U	Cipher secret keys	W, EX
Release all resources of hash context created by gcry_md_open()	N/A	N/A	Zeroises all sensitive information associated with this cipher handle	N/A	U	N/A	W, EX
Release the S-expression objects SEXP	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	U	RSA/DSA asymmetric key pair	R, W, EX
Show	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	U CO	N/A	R, EX

Service	Algorithm	Key Length	Note / Mode	CAVS Cert.	Role	CSPs	Access
Status							
Installation and configuration of the module	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	CO	N/A	R, EX

Table 6: Cryptographic Module's Approved Services

Service (involving algorithm)	Note / Mode	Role	Access
RSA	Encryption/decryption: 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits	U	R, W, EX
	Signature generation, key generation: 4096 bits		
	RSA signature verification: 4096 bits		

Table 7: Cryptographic Module's non-Approved but allowed in FIPS mode Services

The following table shows the available services, the roles allowed, the Critical Security Parameters involved and how they are accessed in the non-FIPS mode:

Service (involving algorithm)	Note / Mode	Role	Access
ARC4	Encryption and decryption (stream cipher)	U	
Blowfish	Encryption and decryption	U	
Camellia	Encryption and decryption	U	
Cast5	Encryption and decryption	U	
CRC32	Cyclic redundancy code	U	
CSPRNG	Cryptographically Secure Pseudorandom Number Generator	U	
DES	Encryption and decryption (key size of 56 bits)	U	
El Gamal	Key pair generation, encryption and decryption, signature generation, signature verification	U	
Gost	28147 encryption	U	
	R 34.11-94 hash	U	
	R 34.11-2012 (Stribog) hash		
HMAC (SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512)	Key size < 112 bits	U	
IDEA	Encryption and decryption	U	
MD4	Hashing Digest size 128 bit	U	
MD5	Hashing Digest size 128 bit	U	
OpenPGP S2K Salted and	Password based key derivation compliant with OpenPGP (RFC4880)	U	

Service (involving algorithm)	Note / Mode	Role	Access
Iterated/salted			
RC2	Encryption and decryption based on RFC 2268	U	
RIPEMD 160	Hashing	U	
RSA	Encryption/decryption: 1024 bits		
	Signature generation, key generation: 1024 bits	U	
SEED	Encryption and decryption	U	
Serpent	Encryption and decryption	U	
Tiger	Hashing	U	
Twofish	Encryption and decryption	U	
2-key Triple-DES	Encryption	U	
Whirlpool	Hashing	U	
Services available in FIPS mode	The services available in FIPS mode can be used in non-FIPS mode CSPs/keys separation is enforced between both modes	U	

Table 8: Cryptographic Module's non-Approved Services and Algorithms

Note:

1. *RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)*

### 4.3 Authentication

The module is a Level 1 software-only cryptographic module and does not implement authentication. The role is implicitly assumed based on the service requested.

## 5 Physical Security

The module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.

## 6 Operational Environment

### 6.1 Applicability

The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-2 level 1 specifications. The module runs on a commercially available general-purpose operating system executing on the hardware specified in section 2.2.

The Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system is used as the basis of other products which include but are not limited to:

- Red Hat Enterprise Linux Atomic Host
- Red Hat Virtualization (RHV)
- Red Hat OpenStack Platform
- OpenShift Container Platform
- Red Hat Gluster Storage
- Red Hat Ceph Storage
- Red Hat CloudForms
- Red Hat Satellite.

Compliance is maintained for these products whenever the binary is found unchanged.

### 6.2 Policy

The operating system is restricted to a single operator (concurrent operators are explicitly excluded). The application that request cryptographic services is the single user of the module, even when the application is serving multiple clients.

In FIPS Approved mode, the ptrace(2) system call, the debugger (gdb(1)), and strace(1) shall be not used.

## 7 Cryptographic Key Management

The application that uses the module is responsible for appropriate destruction and zeroization of the key material. The library provides functions for key allocation and destruction, which overwrites the memory that is occupied by the key information with “zeros” before it is deallocated.

### 7.1 Random Number Generation

The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90A] for the creation of asymmetric and symmetric keys.

The DRBG is initialized during module initialization. The module loads by default the DRBG using HMAC\_DRBG with SHA-256 and derivation function tests without prediction resistance. The DRBG is seeded during initialization with a seed obtained from /dev/random of the appropriate length depending on the instantiated type (see section 10 of [SP800-90A]).

The module performs continuous tests on the output of the DRBG to ensure that consecutive random numbers do not repeat. The noise source of /dev/random also implements continuous tests.

Here are listed the CSPs/keys details concerning storage, input, output, generation and zeroization:

Keys/CSPs	Key Generation	Key Storage	Key Entry/Output	Key Zeroization
AES Keys	Use of the module's SP 800-90A DRBG	Application's memory	API input/output parameters and return values within the physical boundaries of the module	Automatically zeroized when freeing the cipher handler by calling gcry_free()
Triple-DES Keys	Use of the module's SP 800-90A DRBG	Application's memory	API input/output parameters and return values within the physical boundaries of the module	Automatically zeroized when freeing the cipher handler by calling gcry_free()
DSA private keys	Use of the module's SP 800-90A DRBG and the modules DSA key generation mechanism	Application's memory	API input/output parameters and return values within the physical boundaries of the module	Automatically zeroized when freeing the cipher handler by calling gcry_free()
RSA private keys	Use of the module's SP 800-90A DRBG and the modules RSA key generation mechanism	Application's memory	API input/output parameters and return values within the physical boundaries of the module	Automatically zeroized when freeing the cipher handler by calling gcry_free()
SP 800-90A DRBG Entropy string	The seed data obtained from hardware random number generator /dev/random	Application's memory	N/A	Automatically zeroized when freeing DRBG handler by calling gcry_free()
SP 800-90A DRBG Seed and internal state values (C and V values)	Based on entropy string as defined in SP 800-90A	Application's memory	N/A	Automatically zeroized when freeing DRBG handler by calling gcry_free()
HMAC Keys	Use of the module's SP 800-90A DRBG	Application's memory	API input/output parameters and return values within the	Automatically zeroized when freeing the cipher handler by

			physical boundaries of the module	calling gcry_free()
--	--	--	-----------------------------------	---------------------

Table 9: Keys/CSPs

## 7.2 Key / Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Access

An authorized application as user (the User role) has access to all key data generated during the operation of the module. Moreover, the module does not support the output of intermediate key generation values during the key generation process.

## 7.3 Key / CSP Storage

Public and private keys are provided to the module by the calling process, and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls. The module does not perform persistent storage of keys.

## 7.4 Key / CSP Zeroization

The memory occupied by keys is allocated by regular memory allocation operating system calls. The application is responsible for calling the appropriate destruction functions provided in the module's API by using the API function gcry\_free(). The destruction functions overwrite the memory occupied by keys with "zeros" and deallocates the memory with the regular memory deallocation operating system call. In case of abnormal termination, or swap in/out of a physical memory page of a process, the keys in physical memory are overwritten by the Linux kernel before the physical memory is allocated to another process.

## 8 Self Tests

### 8.1 Power-Up Tests

The module performs power-up tests at module initialization to ensure that the module is not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. The selftests are performed without any user intervention.

While the module is performing the power-up tests, services are not available and input or output is not possible: the module is single-threaded and will not return to the calling application until the self-tests are completed successfully.

#### 8.1.1 Integrity Tests

The integrity of the module is verified comparing the HMAC-SHA-256 value calculated at run time with the HMAC value stored in the module that was computed at build time.

#### 8.1.2 Cryptographic algorithm tests

The module performs self-tests on all FIPS-Approved cryptographic algorithms supported in the approved mode of operation, using the known answer tests (KAT) shown in the following table:

Algorithm	Tests
Triple-DES	KAT, encryption and decryption tested separately
AES 128	KAT, encryption and decryption tested separately
AES 192	KAT, encryption and decryption tested separately
AES 256	KAT, encryption and decryption tested separately
SHA-1	KAT
SHA-224	KAT
SHA-256	KAT
SHA-384	KAT
SHA-512	KAT
HMAC SHA-1	KAT
HMAC SHA-224	KAT
HMAC SHA-256	KAT
HMAC SHA-384	KAT
HMAC SHA-512	KAT
DRBG (Hash, HMAC and CTR-based)	KAT
RSA	KAT of signature generation/verification
DSA	PCT of signature generation/verification
Module Integrity test	HMAC SHA-256

Table 10: Self-tests

## 8.2 On-Demand self-tests

The module provides the Self-Test service to perform self-tests on demand. This service performs the same cryptographic algorithm tests executed during power-up, plus some extended self-tests, such as testing additional block chaining modes. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services are not available and no data output or input is possible. To invoke the on-demand self-tests, the user can invoke the `gcry_control(GCRYCTL_SELFTEST)` command.

## 8.3 Conditional Tests

The module performs conditional tests on the cryptographic algorithms shown in the following table:

Algorithm	Test
DRBG	The continuous random number test is only used in FIPS mode. The RNG generates random numbers per block size depending on the underlying DRBG type (CTR; HMAC or Hash); the 1 <sup>st</sup> block generated per context is saved in the context and another block is generated to be returned to the caller. Each block is compared against the saved block and then stored in the context. If a duplicated block is detected, an error is signaled and the library is put into the "Fatal-Error" state. (random/drbg.c:cdrbg_fips_continuous_test)
RSA	The test creates a random number of the size of p-64 bits and encrypts this value with the public key. Then the test checks that the encrypted value does not match the plaintext value. The test decrypts the ciphertext value and checks that it matches the original plaintext. The test will then generate another random plaintext, sign it, modify the signature by incrementing its value by 1, and verify that the signature verification fails. (cipher/rsa.c:test_keys())
DSA	The test uses a random number of the size of the q parameter to create a signature and then checks that the signature verification is successful. As a second signing test, the data is modified by incrementing its value and then is verified against the signature with the expected result that the verification fails. (cipher/dsa.c:test_keys())

Table 11: Conditional Tests

## 9 Guidance

The following guidance items are to be used for assistance in maintaining the module's validated status while in use.

### 9.1 Crypto Officer Guidance

The version of the RPMs containing the FIPS validated Module is stated in section 1 above.

The RPM package of the Module can be installed by standard tools recommended for the installation of RPM packages on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux system (for example, yum, rpm, and the RHN remote management tool).

For proper operation of the in-module integrity verification, the prelink has to be disabled. This can be done by setting PRELINKING=no in the /etc/sysconfig/prelink configuration file. If the libraries were already prelinked, the prelink should be undone on all the system files using the 'prelink -u -a' command.

The ciphers listed in Table 8 are not allowed to be used.

To bring the Module into FIPS Approved mode, perform the following:

1. Install the dracut-fips package:

```
# yum install dracut-fips
```

2. Recreate the INITRAMFS image:

```
# dracut -f
```

After regenerating the initramfs, the Crypto Officer has to append the following string to the kernel command line by changing the setting in the boot loader:

```
fips=1
```

If /boot or /boot/efi resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter boot=<partition of /boot or /boot/efi> must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the command

```
"df /boot"
```

or

```
"df /boot/efi"
```

respectively. For example:

```
$ df /boot
Filesystem      1K-blocks  Used    Mounted on  Available
Use%
/dev/sda1       233191    30454    /boot      190296
14%
```

The partition of /boot is located on /dev/sda1 in this example. Therefore, the following string needs to be appended to the kernel command line:

```
"boot=/dev/sda1"
```

Reboot to apply these settings.

Because FIPS 140-2 has certain restrictions on the use of cryptography which are not always wanted, the Module needs to be put into FIPS Approved mode explicitly: if the file /proc/sys/crypto/fips\_enabled exists and contains a numeric value other than 0, the Module is put into FIPS Approved mode at initialization time. This is the mechanism recommended for ordinary use, activated by using the fips=1 option in the boot loader, as described above.

If an application that uses the Module for its cryptography is put into a chroot environment, the Crypto Officer must ensure one of the above methods is available to the Module from within the chroot environment to ensure entry into FIPS Approved mode. Failure to do so will not allow the application to properly enter FIPS Approved mode.

Once the Module has been put into FIPS Approved mode, it is not possible to switch back to standard mode without terminating the process first.

If an application that uses the Module for its cryptography is put into a chroot environment, the Crypto Officer must ensure one of the above methods is available to the Module from within the chroot environment to ensure entry into FIPS approved mode. Failure to do so will not allow the application to properly enter FIPS approved mode.

Because FIPS 140-2 has certain restrictions on the use of cryptography which are not always wanted, libgcrypt needs to be put into FIPS mode explicitly. To switch libgcrypt into this mode, the file `/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled` must contain a numeric value other than 0. If the application requests FIPS mode, use the control command

```
gcry_control(GCRYCTL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE).
```

This must be done prior to any initialization (i.e. before the `gcry_check_version()` function).

Once libgcrypt has been put into FIPS mode, it is not possible to switch back to standard mode without terminating the process first. If the logging verbosity level of libgcrypt has been set to at least 2, the state transitions and the self tests are logged.

## 9.2 User Guidance

Applications using libgcrypt need to call

`gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0)` after initialization is done: that ensures that the DRBG is properly seeded, among others.

`gcry_control(GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM)` needs to be called before the process is terminated.

The function `gcry_set_allocation_handler()` may not be used.

The user must not call `malloc/free` to create/release space for keys, let libgcrypt manage space for keys, which will ensure that the key memory is overwritten before it is released.

See the documentation file `doc/gcrypt.texi` within the source code tree for complete instructions for use.

The information pages are included within the developer package. The user can find the documentation at the following location after having installed the developer package:

```
/usr/share/info/gcrypt.info-1.gz
/usr/share/info/gcrypt.info-2.gz
/usr/share/info/gcrypt.info.gz
```

### 9.2.1 Three-key Triple-DES

It is the calling application's responsibility to make sure that the three keys `k1`, `k2` and `k3` are independent. Two-key triple-DES usage will bring the module into the non-Approved mode of operation implicitly.

## 10 Mitigation of Other Attacks

libgcrypt uses a blinding technique for RSA decryption to mitigate real world timing attacks over a network: Instead of using the RSA decryption directly, a blinded value ( $y = x \cdot r^e \pmod n$ ) is decrypted and the unblinded value ( $x' = y' \cdot r^{-1} \pmod n$ ) returned. The blinding value “r” is a random value with the size of the modulus “n” and generated with `GCRY\_WEAK\_RANDOM` random level.

Weak Triple-DES keys are detected as follows:

In DES there are 64 known keys which are weak because they produce only one, two, or four different subkeys in the subkey scheduling process. The keys in this table have all their parity bits cleared.

```
static byte weak_keys[64][8] =
{
  { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, /*w*/
  { 0x00, 0x00, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0e, 0x0e },
  { 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xf0 },
  { 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xfe },
  { 0x00, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x0e, 0x00, 0x0e }, /*sw*/
  { 0x00, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0x00 },
  { 0x00, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0xfe },
  { 0x00, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0xf0 },
  { 0x00, 0xe0, 0x00, 0xe0, 0x00, 0xf0, 0x00, 0xf0 }, /*sw*/
  { 0x00, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0xfe },
  { 0x00, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0x00 },
  { 0x00, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x0e },
  { 0x00, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xfe }, /*sw*/
  { 0x00, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0xf0 },
  { 0x00, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0x0e },
  { 0x00, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x00 },
  { 0x1e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1e, 0x0e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0e },
  { 0x1e, 0x00, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x0e, 0x00, 0x0e, 0x00 }, /*sw*/
  { 0x1e, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xfe },
  { 0x1e, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0x0e, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xf0 },
  { 0x1e, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0x00, 0x00 },
  { 0x1e, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0x0e }, /*w*/
  { 0x1e, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0xf0 },
  { 0x1e, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0xfe },
  { 0x1e, 0xe0, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0x00, 0xfe },
  { 0x1e, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0xf0 }, /*sw*/
  { 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0x0e },
  { 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x00 },
  { 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xe0, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xf0 },
  { 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0xfe }, /*sw*/
  { 0x1e, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0x00 },
  { 0x1e, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x0e },
  { 0xe0, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xf0, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0 },
  { 0xe0, 0x00, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0xf0, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xfe },
  { 0xe0, 0x00, 0xe0, 0x00, 0xf0, 0x00, 0xf0, 0x00 }, /*sw*/
  { 0xe0, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0xf0, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x0e },
  { 0xe0, 0x1e, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0x00, 0xfe },
  { 0xe0, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0xf0 },
  { 0xe0, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0x0e }, /*sw*/
  { 0xe0, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0x00 },
  { 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0x00, 0x00 },
  { 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0x0e },
  { 0xe0, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0xf0 }, /*w*/
  { 0xe0, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xfe },
  { 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x1e, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x0e },
  { 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0x00 },
  { 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0xfe }, /*sw*/
}
```

```

{ 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xf0 },
{ 0xfe, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe },
{ 0xfe, 0x00, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xf0 },
{ 0xfe, 0x00, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xf0, 0x0e },
{ 0xfe, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x00 }, /*sw*/
{ 0xfe, 0x1e, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0x00, 0xf0 },
{ 0xfe, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0xfe },
{ 0xfe, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0x00 },
{ 0xfe, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0x0e }, /*sw*/
{ 0xfe, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0x00, 0x0e },
{ 0xfe, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0x00 },
{ 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0xfe },
{ 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xf0 }, /*sw*/
{ 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x00 },
{ 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0x0e },
{ 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0xf0 },
{ 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe } /*w*/ };

```

## Appendix A Glossary and Abbreviations

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-NI	Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CCM	Counter with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
CFB	Cipher Feedback
CMAC	Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMT	Cryptographic Module Testing
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CPACF	Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Functions
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
CTR	Counter Mode
CVT	Component Verification Testing
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DFT	Derivation Function Test
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB	Electronic Code Book
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
FFC	Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
FSM	Finite State Model
GCM	Galois Counter Mode
HMAC	Hash Message Authentication Code
KAT	Known Answer Test
MAC	Message Authentication Code
NIST	National Institute of Science and Technology
NDRNG	Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
OFB	Output Feedback
OS	Operating System
PAA	Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PR	Prediction Resistance
PSS	Probabilistic Signature Scheme

RNG	Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS	Secure Hash Standard
SSH	Secure Shell
TDES	Triple DES
UI	User Interface
XTS	XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext Stealing

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